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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER LARSON, ALEIDA P. 
LARSON and JON LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ROBERT GEORGE EVANS, M.D., 
Defenda.nt and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9365 
REP·L Y BRIEF O~F AP·PELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case, as well as the law applicable 
thereto, are fully discussed in plaintiffs' opening brief. 
Plaintiffs do not feel that a reply brief is necessary 
insofar as the material issues are concerned. However, 
defendant's answering brief, in attempting to torture 
plaintiff Jon Larson's testimony into some semblance of 
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a defense, is repleat with mis-statements of both law and 
fact which, if not corrected, might prejudice plaintiffs' 
case. 
For the convenience of the court we therefore indi-
cate such mis-statements and respectfully urge the court 
to examine the record of these proceedings. 
The defendant would have this court believe that 
the plaintiffs' brief excluded the testimony of Jon Lar-
son. (Page 1 of defendant's brief). Quite to the contrary, 
the plaintiffs' brief contained every pertinent portion of 
his testimony that is contained in the defendant's brief, 
including his statements relative to the location of both 
vehicles when he first saw defendant's automobile, his 
speed, his failure to recall applying his brakes, and the 
length of time he observed defendant's headlights. 
(Pages 4-5 of plaintiffs' original brief). 
The defendant contends that the testimony of the 
plaintiff driver is inconsistent in that he stated he saw 
defendant's headlights for two seconds and yet testified, 
to the best of his knowledge, that he did not recall seeing 
the defendant's automobile until he was entering the 
intersection. The former testimony is fully consistent 
with the undisputed physical evidence in the case which 
indicated skid marks and reaction distance totaling 73 
feet from the point of impact thereby placing the Larson 
vehicle some distance south of the intersection at the 
time that observation of danger by the plaintiff driver 
resulted in his taking defensive measures to avoid col-
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lision. ( R. 419-420). Likewise, Jon Larson's testimony 
that he did not see the defendant's automobile until he 
was entering the intersection is absolutely consistent 
with the undisputed physical evidence relating to the 
existence of a dense :five- or six-foot hedge which extend-
ed along the south side of Evergreen Avenue to its 
intersection with 23rd East. (R.121, 127,422, 136-137, 175, 
366-367 and Exhibit P-1). Thus, in view of the defend-
ant's own testimony that he did not see the plaintiff's 
automobile until both cars were in the intersection (R. 
118, 121) because of the existence of said hedge and the 
testimony of the defendant's passenger to the same 
effect (R. 365-366), it is absolutely clear that Jon Lar-
son's testimony is consistent with the only physical 
possibility under the circumstances. Jon Larson's testi-
mony, when viewed in light of the undisputed physical 
evidence, indicates an unusual degree of consistency, 
frankness and honesty rather than being frought with 
deceit as defendant alleges. 
With respect to the income of Jon Larson, which is 
completely immaterial to this appeal, the defendant 
would have the court believe that the witness willfully 
misrepresented his income as being $1,000 per month at 
the time his deposition was taken but then testified at 
the trial that his income was only $500 per month and 
that his previous statement was an exaggeration. (Page 
4 of defendant's brief). The facts are much different than 
they are represented by defendant. Mr. Larson testified 
on direct examination that he received a monthly salary 
of $500 plus override and commissions amounting to 
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$300 or more, which would have to be established more 
accurately by his bookkeeper. (R. 194). On cross-examina-
tion he declared that the figure given in his deposition 
was correct to the best of his ability to estimate at that 
time, and any variance between that figure and the ac-
tual amount of his income was an ''unintentional exag-
geration" on his part. (R. 202-204). Certainly, no willful 
misrepresentation can be conjured from such testimony. 
Again on page 5 of defendant's brief it is represented 
that Officer Gunn testified that there was no hedge, that 
his measurement began from the corner of the house and 
not the hedge as previously represented by plaintiffs. 
The defendant then cites page 121 of the Record on 
Appeal to sustain his statements. That page is entirely 
devoted to the testimony of the defendant and has no 
bearing on the matters raised. The pure fabrication of 
the statements made by the defendant in his brief can 
be shown by quoting the record itself. At pages 126-127 
thereof, Officer Gunn testified as follo·ws: 
'' Q. Yes. In that regard, Officer, perhaps I can 
call your attention to \Yhat has been marked as 
Exhibit 1-P and draw your attention specifically 
to the north-south street which is designated on 
the diagram as 23rd East and the street which is 
defined here as running from east to west and 
west to east described as EYer green A venue 1 
''A. Uh huh. 
'' Q. Are you familiar with such an inter-
section? 
''A. Yes, I am. 
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'' Q. Would this be the same intersection in 
question'? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. Officer Gunn, would you please state for 
the benefit of the jury, are you familiar with this 
particular intersection~ 
''A. Yes, I am. 
"Q. Would you say that this diagram as it is 
drawn fairly represents the area in question~ 
''A. Yes, it does, it is exactly it. 
'' Q. Now going back to my previous question, 
Officer, would you please state for the benefit of 
the jury what did your physical investigation of 
the area determine~ 
''A. Well, on the southeast corner on the Ever-
green side there was a hedge and shrubs. 
"Q. c ld ou you ... 
''A. About approximately ... 
'' Q. Could you point these things out~ 
''A. About four to five feet tall about right in 
here. 
'' Q. Does that description on the diagram 
fairly well represent that . 
''A. Yes, it does. 
"Q .... row of shrubs~ 
"A. Yes." 
In view of the fact that the hedge had been removed 
at the time of the trial, Officer Gunn testified as follows 
at pages 421-422 of the Record on Appeal: 
'' Q. Did you stand in that street on the night 
of the accident~ 
''A. Yes, I did. 
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"Q. On the night of the accident was that 
hedge there~ 
''A. Yes, it was. 
'' Q. Could you describe the hedge~ 
''A. The hedge was of a regular hedge variety, 
approximately four to five feet tall. I didn't meas-
ure the exact height but it was pretty well up. 
"Q. State whether or not you could see 
through it~ 
''A. No, you couldn't. 
'' Q. Was it a very dense hedge~ 
''A. It was a regular thick hedge.'' 
With respect to the measurement of skid marks and 
reaction time by Officer Gunn, he testified as follows, at 
page 420 of the Record on Appeal: 
'' Q. Then would it be fair to say that he was 
first apprised of danger and acted to do some-
thing about it 73 feet back from the point of 
impact~ 
"A. That's right. Now this 33 feet, we mean 
that is a thinking time it takes to get the foot off 
the throttle or wherever it was onto the brake. 
"Q. And that was the average reasonable 
man~ 
"A. That's right, 33 feet. 
"Q. Were you able to determine on your dia-
gram what point that would be in relation to this 
intersection~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Could you show it there on the diagram)! 
''A. We measured back 40 feet jr01n the point 
of impact which we determined by the land ma.rk 
we set first and that would brin.g it down to 13 
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feet 8 inches sot£th of the south mark of the hedge, 
or the hedge mark and the pole here; 13 feet 8 
inches south of this obstruction here." 
(Emphasis added). 
The misrepresentation of the actual facts by the de-
fendant is clearly apparent from the above. The only 
statement by Officer Gunn as to the absence of said hedge 
had reference to the time of the trial after said hedge 
had been removed and not to the conditions prevailing 
at the time of the accident. (R. 420). 
Again the defendant would have this court believe 
that the defendant observed the plaintiff's automobile 
to be 50 feet away as the defendant entered the intersec-
tion, and attempts to sustain this fact through the state-
ment of Officer Gunn that the defendant so stated to him 
on the night of the accident. (R. 125-126). BUT defend-
ant fails to advise the court of his own statements upon 
the subject to the effect that, because of the existence of 
the hedge, he did not see the Larson vehicle until it was 
toward the front of him. (R. 121). Likewise, his own 
passenger testified that both cars were in the inter-
section before she noticed danger. (R. 365). It is apparent 
that defendant's counsel has attempted to attribute state-
ments to his client which the defendant, himself, has 
refuted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
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IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JO~ 
LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO 
THE JURY. 
PoiNT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN 
PAGES 27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 
430 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT 
IT WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION 
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
PoiNT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JON 
LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO 
THE JURY. 
rrhe defendant's argument under Point I consists 
of an attempt to prove excessive speed and failure to 
keep a proper lookout on the part of the plaintiff driver 
but does not cite any authority contrary to that set forth 
in plaintiffs' original brief. Defendant apparently takes 
the position that the plaintiffs were required to establish 
the speed limit upon 23rd East in order to prove the 
defendant's defense of contributory negligence. (See 
page 4 of defendant's brief). The defendant attempts to 
establish the speed limit at 25 miles per hour as being 
within a residential area. (See page 9 of defendant's 
brief). The plain truth of the matter is that said street 
is, and was, posted for a 35-mile-per-hour limit, and in 
the absence of proof of the speed limit thereon, the only 
applicable speed limit available for consideration is that 
of 50 miles per hour, unless this court will take judicial 
notice of the posted speed limit. In the absence of such 
an evidentiary guide to assist the jury it was clearly error 
for the lower court to allow the jury to speculate as to 
whether the Larson vehicle was being driven at an ex-
cessiYe or unreasonable speed. See Olsen. v. W arwood, 
123 U. 111, 255 P. 2d 725; Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 
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268 P. 2d 986; and other cases cited in plaintiffs' original 
brief at pages 15-19 thereof. 
With respect to speed and the maintenance of proper 
lookout, the defendant cites cases holding that whether 
speed or failure to keep a proper lookout is the proxi-
mate cause of an accident is a question of fact to be de-
termined by the jury. But the defendant fails to take 
into consideration the requirement that there must be 
substantial evidence of speed or improper lookout such 
as would constitute negligence before the question of 
proximate cause is even called into issue. The record in 
this case does not disclose any such evidence. As pointed 
out hereinabove, and in plaintiffs' previous brief, the un-
disputed physical evidence in the record, i. e., skid marks, 
reaction time, and the existence of the hedge in relation 
to the intersection involved, completely rules out any 
inferenee of improper lookout on the part of the plain-
tiff driver. And even if his statements concerning the 
location of his automobile at the time he first saw defend-
ant's automobile were considered as evidenee of improper 
lookout, rather than evidence in support of the undis-
puted physical facts as above explained, such evidence 
would still be insufficient, as a matter of law, under the 
rule laid down in Haarstrich v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 
70 U. 552, 262 P. 101, that testimony which is contrary to 
uncontroverted physical facts DOES NOT CONSTI-
TUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The defendant also alleges, without any reference to 
any evidence whatsoever, that Jon Larson did not have 
10 
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eontrol enough to swerYc his car to the opposite side of 
the road to avoid the accident. (Page 10 of defendant's 
brief). Jon Larson testified that he did cramp his wheels 
to the left to avoid the accident. (R. 171, 200, 202). And 
the defendant himself testified that attempts were made 
by both cars to avoid the accident. (R. 116). In addition 
the defendant admitted that the accident was due to his 
own fault. (R. 124, 404). Certainly, if the plaintiff driver 
had been traveling at an excessive speed with no con-
trol over his automobile in addition to maintaining an im-
proper lookout, the defendant would have so indicated 
rather than assume full responsibility for the accident as 
he did. The above evidence, when viewed in connection 
with the undisputed physical evidence relating to skid 
marks, reaction time and visual impediments, absolutely 
negates any inference of lack of control on the part of 
the plaintiff driver. Certainly such evidence does not 
constitute substantial evidence or a preponderance of 
the evidence in favor of such a finding. The authorities 
heretofore cited with respect to permitting a jury to 
speculate upon evidence or to base findings of fact upon 
surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation, are fully 
applicable in this regard. 
Thus, as pointed out in plaintiffs' original brief, the 
lower court erred in submitting the question of the plain-
tiff driver's contributory negligence to the jury for the 
follo\ving reasons: (1) There is no evidence in the rec-
ord upon which to base such a finding; (2) there is no 
substantial evidence upon which to base such a finding as 
a matter of law; (3) there is no preponderance of evi-
11 
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dence upon which to base such a finding ; ( 4) reasonable 
minds could not differ upon the evidence in this case as 
to the exercise of due care by the plaintiff driver; ( 5) it 
allowed the jury to speculate upon evidence which was 
not substantial in nature; (6) it allowed the jury to base 
a finding of fact on surmise, conjecture, guess, or specula-
tion; (7) the only evidence upon which such a finding 
could have been made was as consistent, and even more 
so, with the absence of negligence than with its existence; 
and (8) it left to the jury the power to "hold that negli-
gence might be inferred from any state of facts what-
ever." The defendant's brief has failed to provide any 
law contradictory to the above. It necessarily follows that 
each and every aspect of the claimed contributory negli-
gence which was submitted to the jury was not sup-
ported by the evidence, as a matter of law, and, therefore, 
the court erred in submitting the special interrogatories 
contained in Instruction No. 17 to the jury. Likewise, the 
verdict and judgment were not sustained by the evidence 
as a matter of law. 
PoiNT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN 
PAGES 27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 
430 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth 
under Point I and for the reasons therein set forth urge 
12 
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this court to set aside the verdict and judgment of the 
lower court and order said court to grant the plaintiffs a 
new trial solely for the purpose of ascertaining the 
amount of damages suffered by each individual plaintiff 
and that the lower court enter judgment for plaintiffs 
in accordance with such findings. 
PoiNT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth 
under Points I, IV and V. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS 
INSTRUCTION NO.3 FOR THE REASON THAT 
IT WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION 
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The defendant cites the holding in Toone v. J. P. 
O'Neill Construction Comparny,. 40 U. 265, 121 P. 10, as 
authority for the proposition that a court may instruct 
on unrelated propositions in the same instruction. A cur-
sory examination of the quoted portion of said case in 
defendant's brief will conclusively show the incorrectness 
of that contention. In the Toone ca.se, this court held that 
an instruction in accordance with the appellant's evidence 
13 
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and in accordance with the respondent's evidence upon 
the same proposition is proper. That case was properly 
cited in plaintiffs' original brief and the defendant has 
wrongfully charged the plaintiffs with citing the case 
inaccurately in his brief. The court can easily determine 
the source of the inaccuracy upon this point. 
The defendant has completely failed to justify the 
giving of Instruction No. 3 by the lower court, which 
united an instruction upon the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff driver with an instruction that the de-
fendant was negligent as a matter of law. Such instruc-
tion clearly constitutes reversible error even in the 
absence of reversal under Points I, II, and III. 
PorNT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
Plaintiffs reincorporate the argument set forth in 
their previous brief under POINT V. The defendant 
argues that the inclusion of the questioned instruction in 
J. I. F. U. necessarily precludes any question as to its 
proper application under the facts of this case. Again 
plaintiffs reiterate that said instruction, as it related to 
this case, allowed the jury to reconsider the negligence 
of the defendant which had already been determined as 
a matter of law by the lower court, and, in the absence 
of limiting said instruction to the claimed contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff driver, the lower court com-
mitted reversible error for the reason that the effect of 
14 
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such instruction upon the jury is not capable of ascer-
tainment. The giving of instructions that permit the re-
determination of the existence of negligence by a jury 
upon facts which have been determined negligent as a 
matter of law by the court constitutes reversible error. 
Jlorrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. 2d 772. 
CONCLUSION 
It is indeed a strange appellate procedure which 
leads the defendant to attack the veracity and truth-
fulness of plaintiff Jon Larson's testimony with such 
vehemence as that employed by the defendant in his brief 
and then rest his entire case upon the testimony of that 
plaintiff which defendant claims is contrary to the undis-
puted physical evidence of the case. An examination of 
the transcript clearly reveals that, contrary to defend-
ant's assertions, said plaintiff's testimony sustains the 
uncontroverted physical facts of this case rather than 
being in conflict therewith. Such an analysis is to be fav-
ored in vie''T of the rule of this court that testimony which 
is contrary to uncontroverted physical facts does not con-
stitute substantial evidence. Under such rule, even if 
Jon Larson's testimony was found to be in conflict with 
the undisputed physical evidence, it would be insufficient 
to sustain the verdict of the jury. The absence of any 
substantial evidence relating to improper lookout, speed 
and control of the automobile driven by Jon Larson re-
quires the reversal of the verdict and judgment of the 
15 
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lower court. In addition thereto the giving of instruc-
tions No. 3 and No. 8 by the trial court constituted 
reversible error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONN E. CASSITY, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., 
JACK L. CRELLIN, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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